The Perverse Politics of Four-Letter Words: Risk and Pity in the Securitisation of Human Trafficking

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This article unpacks two constructions of human trafficking: as a security threat and as a humanitarian problem. Restricting its focus to trafficking of women for the sex industry, the article highlights the double identification of these women as illegal migrants and victims, prostitutes and suffering bodies. How are these schizophrenic identifications possible? An analysis of the security and humanitarian articulations as governmental interventions in Michel Foucault’s sense of the term locates a perverse continuity. As the bodies in pain governed by a ‘politics of pity’ metamorphose into psychological cases to be governed by risk technologies within a ‘politics of risk’, the humanitarian and security interventions are shown to be in no way mutually exclusive.

‘Central to the problem of policing THB [trafficking in human beings] is the difficulty in clearly identifying the threat that THB poses to a State’.1 Thus starts a recent Europol report on human trafficking. The report goes on to elaborate the threats that illegal migration, organised crime and, by association, human trafficking pose to the state. Another report, this time under the aegis of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), is more explicit in identifying trafficking as ‘the most menacing form of irregular migration due to its ever-increasing scale and complexity involving, as it does arms, drugs, prostitution and so on’.2 As these reports indicate, human trafficking has recently become visible on

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the European political agenda as part of a security continuum linking illegal migration, drug trafficking, terrorism, and organised crime.3

Alongside the political visibility entailed in their securitisation, these threats have also slowly but steadily colonised the academic territory of security studies and captured the attention of scholars already in a consensus over the multiplication of dangers and threats in the post-Cold War world. The ‘new’ threats have been variously linked with the disappearance of the communist enemy and the subsequent need to reinvent a multitude of other enemies and dangers, with the nation-states’ pathological reaction to globalisation by reasserting sovereignty through controlling cross-border movements, with an ‘outdated’ imaginary of closed and homogenous communities, or with bureaucratic struggles.4

This article will, however, neither explore the rationale for such a proliferation of new dangers nor speculate on their symbolic or imaginary status. It will attempt to understand how a humanitarian discourse, spanning efforts to salvage migrants, boat people, asylum-seekers or trafficked women, can be appropriated within a securitising discourse where migrants, boat people, asylum-seekers or trafficked women are integrated in a continuum of danger. This is not a matter of simply pointing out a renaming of human rights as human security, as that would only be a banal point. What concerns me here is how two apparently incompatible discursive regimes are entwined and feed upon each other. I shall attempt to shed light on their relation by looking at the trafficking of women for sex work.5


5. There are numerous definitions of the phenomenon of human trafficking and even more numerous denominations: human trafficking, human trade, trafficking in human beings, trafficking in persons, trafficking in women, trafficking of aliens, human commodity trafficking and the list could continue. I shall use ‘human trafficking’ and ‘trafficking in women’ interchangeably, simply because they are used as such in the politicisation of trafficking. Although it is not exclusively women who are trafficked and sex work is not the sole form of exploitation, it is women in the sex trade who are mainly categorised and governed as victims of trafficking.
The security continuum in which trafficking is integrated intersects with a humanitarian discourse which structures the situation of trafficking by focusing on victims who are denied ‘their rights to liberty, dignity, security of person, the right not to be held in slavery, the right to be free from cruel and inhumane treatment.’ According to this latter discourse, managing the phenomenon of trafficking should be reframed by tending to the needs of trafficked women. Such re-structuring in terms of human rights or human security redefines trafficking not as a diffuse threat to the state, but as a threat to women: they have fallen victim to trafficking networks and risk being re-victimised by states, which will attempt to locate, identify and deport them. As illegal migrants, prostitutes and (potential) criminals, trafficked women are a cause of insecurity; as victims, they are also simultaneously vulnerable and made insecure themselves.

Despite an apparent logical incompatibility between these humanitarian and security discourses, they are now happily married in the European Union (EU) policies for the prevention of trafficking. While promoting women as bearers of human rights was initially devised as an NGO counter-strategy to the EU security discourse, a coalition of NGOs and EU actors coupled the two discourses and endorsed them as logically related and mutually reinforcing—thus allowing the humanitarian discourse to be gradually taken up by the EU itself. Yet, how can these different discursive regimes be reconciled, how can trafficked women be an embodiment of threat to Western states while simultaneously awakening sympathy as human beings threatened by the same states?

To expose the perverse relation between the humanitarian and security articulations, I shall consider them as governmental processes: practical interventions with the purpose of managing the phenomenon of trafficking. Coined by Michel Foucault, ‘government’ in this sense refers to acting on the actions of individuals, taken either singly or collectively, so as to shape, guide, conduct and modify the ways in which they conduct themselves. ‘Governmentality’ is not a new import for international studies; security and practices of statecraft have already been conceptualised in governmental terms, most notably by Michael

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Dillon and Jef Huysmans.8 More generally, governmentality has led to illuminating analyses of practices, from refugee regimes to the ‘new regionalism’.

Understood as governmental, the humanitarian and security articulations appear as practical interventions to particular ends, constituting subjects to be governed. The humanitarian discourse will be shown to function more specifically as a ‘politics of pity’, where emotions are used to re-structure the situation of trafficking and govern it to the benefit of trafficked women. The security regime can similarly be thought of as a ‘politics of risk’, as it governs the phenomenon of trafficking by means of technologies of risk management. A governmental analysis brings the question of subjectivation/identification (who are the trafficked women?) to bear on the technologies mobilised by the security and humanitarian interventions (how do they function?), showing that their liaison is not simply a matter of contingency or immanent contradictions. Rather than contingently opposed or mutually exclusive, these interventions will be shown to share an uncanny complicity, structurally related by the logic of their functioning.

Through specific constructions of the subjects to be governed, the security regime appears as a symptom10 of the humanitarian one, as a particular element which fissures and subverts it. Whereas a politics of pity attempts to exteriorise the threat and divorce it from the body of trafficked women, this paper will show how it is undercut by a politics of risk that interiorises danger, relocating it within trafficked women. Structurally, the paper will follow this symptomatic subversion of pity


10. I use here Slavoj Zizek’s definition of the symptom as the ‘point of breakdown heterogeneous to a given ideological field and at the same time necessary for that field to achieve its closure, its accomplished form’. Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1992), 21.
by risk. I shall start by discussing what pity means as a technology of
government, and go on to explore the implications of defining and
identifying trafficked women through a ‘politics of pity’, looking in
particular at NGOs’ practices of representing the suffering of victims in
order to trigger political reactions. The second part of the paper will
focus on the government of risk and use a Foucault-inspired conceptual
toolbox to show how women metamorphose from suffering beings
worthy of pity into risky beings who are to be contained and disciplined.

Emotions and the ‘politics of pity’

Despite the role that the politics of pity and emotions play in practices of
international politics, their potential, challenges or inconsistencies have
received scant scholarly attention. As Neta Crawford has recently
pointed out, International Relations (IR) has tended to ignore explicit
considerations of ‘the passions’, or of emotions more generally.11 Fear has
probably been the only emotion considered in the literature, although it
has also been mostly assumed in discussions of security rather than
problematised.12 IR generally has not taken stock of the emotional
models that drive political interventions and strategies of governance.
From the war on terror to interventions in crisis situations (e.g., famine
and natural catastrophes), political actions depend on and are limited by
emotions. A constitutive aspect of intersubjective relations, emotions
become a technology of government to the extent that they can be used
to steer citizens’ actions. We are to be emotionally affected and
experience solidarity with victims of catastrophes or terrorist attacks,
but to remain immune to the suffering of terrorists.

The ‘politics of pity’13 is such an ‘emotional’ governmental model
practised in relation to victims; in this case, the excluded and suffering
others of international politics. Emotions can foster new commonalities
in the face of diversity, creating solidarities beyond the traditional ones

12. For a very interesting problematisation of the ‘double fear’ in relation to
security, see Jef Huysmans, ‘Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to
13. Following Hannah Arendt’s distinction between ‘compassion’ and ‘pity’,
I have chosen the latter term for the ‘politics of pity’ with the intention of
emphasising the mediation that pity implies. See Arendt, On Revolution
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1990), 59–114. Other authors, however, do not
make a distinction between compassion and pity. See for example Martha
of the nation-state and common morality. In conditions of postmodernity, of fragmentation, discontinuity and inconsequentiality, suffering and emotions are at the heart of a new type of solidarity. Richard Rorty has famously listed among the ungroundable desires of the liberal ironist the hope ‘that suffering will be diminished, that the humiliation of human beings by other human beings may cease’. Rorty saw the possibility of new forms of solidarity which would downplay the importance of traditional differences in comparison to pain and humiliation.

Feminists have also claimed emotions as grounds for progressive political action, challenging the equation of ‘unhealthy’ emotions with feminity. Emotional responses are viewed as important sources of human values and ethics and as a proper basis for political action. The feminist literature has advocated an ‘ethics of care’ to replace the universalising assumptions of the ‘ethics of justice’. Unlike justice, care is focused on concrete others and responds to specific situations. The ethics of care—feminists have argued—forces us to place moral and political concerns within the context of people’s daily lives.

16. Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, Solidarity*, 192. It is however impossible to divorce a material understanding of pain and humiliation from ‘traditional’ differences such as religion, race, customs that Rorty wants to surpass. On Rorty and postmodern politics, see Honi Fern Haber, *Beyond Postmodern Politics: Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault* (London: Routledge, 1994), 68.
19. The ethics of care was initially associated with women’s emotional development and thought to be incompatible with an ‘ethic of justice’. See Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
20. It is interesting that feminism has not engaged with the concept of justice as it has re-emerged in ‘postmodern’ writings. Jean-Francois Lyotard, for example, advocates a conception of justice which would permit the differentiation between multiple language games and différends.
21. Tronto, ‘Care as a Basis’, 142.
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For both feminists and postmodernists, emotions can therefore ground new ways of radical politics, providing a bond for communities and creating solidarity in conditions of fragmentation or fragmented morality. Among emotions, pity as a response to suffering has a special position. In Cynthia Halpern’s formulation, ‘[w]hat we can do is the primal question that arises from the experience of suffering, either in ourselves or in relation to what we see at a distance’.²² Besides functioning as a crucible for empathy and intersubjective notions of the self, suffering is clearly linked with agency and action.²³ Pity thus becomes directly linked with practical interventions, with actions that envisage a re-structuring of the existing situation. A politics of pity tackles the ‘disordered situation’,²⁴ the social context which has led to suffering by privileging particular others. In this sense it is meant to fulfil a double role that commends it to political theory: it can create new commonalities, while at the same time challenging existing social relations which have been conducive to suffering. Here then, unlike fear or hate, pity can be said to function rather as an anti-governmental technology, concerned with emancipation from particular systems of power, or from the effects of the deployment of particular techniques of power.²⁵

Alongside its staunch supporters, the politics of pity also has harsh critics who question its political potential. Wendy Brown has insightfully warned that a politics of pity ‘delimits a specific site of blame for suffering by constituting sovereign subjects and events as responsible’.²⁶ Social constructivists, emphasising that emotions are themselves shaped by social institutions, social systems and power relations,²⁷ are also critical of the transformative role that emotions can play. What suffering becomes recognised in the public domain is a question of struggle and

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²⁵. Barry Hindess has formulated the distinction between the governmental and the anti-governmental in Foucault’s concept of politics. Hindess, ‘Politics and Liberation’, in *The Later Foucault*, ed. Jeremy Moss (London: Sage, 1998), 50–63. As there is a fine line between ‘ordering’, aligned with the purposes of the state and ‘re-ordering’ as an emancipatory practise, for the purposes of this article I shall keep the denomination of ‘governmental’ for both pity and risk.
construction and not of inherent ‘merit’. Even one of the most astute
defenders of a politics of pity, Luc Boltanski, felt it necessary to
formulate its downsides: ‘emotions can be discredited as foundations
and symptoms of a moral position due to their circumstantial
character—bound as they are with a particular situation in which they
are tethered to the real or imaginary presence of a particular
unfortunate—which does not enable or construct a moral duty with
general validity’.28

Yet, all these objections can be thought to function merely as
warnings about the efficacy of a governmental intervention. In one of the
most cogent theoretical treatments of pity, Boltanski engages with
several of the tensions and criticisms of a politics of pity and translates
such theoretical objections into practical injunctions to strategise pity. I
shall therefore follow his cartography of practices of pity to understand
how pity functions for human trafficking. Boltanski acknowledges that
suffering is socially constructed and that certain types of suffering have
surfaced in various epochs, while others have passed unnoticed. He
translates this insight into a practical task for those who convey
suffering: to make it recognisable, to include it in a so-called repertoire
of recognisable suffering. Thus the social construction of emotions is
translated into a political struggle with Bourdieuean undertones.
Boltanski rightly points out that ‘[w]ithin the realm of political struggles
the conflict of beliefs supporting pity corresponds to a conflict over the
identification of the unfortunates whose cause is to be judged politically
worthy’.29 The politics of pity therefore needs to configure suffering as
recognisable, something the spectators can identify and sympathise
with. This socially constructed aspect of suffering and emotional
response is important inasmuch as expertise plays an important role in
training our sensibility as spectators and our emotional imagination
and responsiveness.

The accusatory mode implied by a politics of pity is actually meant
to reveal ‘a defect, flaw, a disorder, a chaos, either in the organisation of
society or in the constitution of the individual’.30 Boltanski does not
explicitly tackle this dichotomy of the disordered situation versus the
disordered individual in the politics of pity. Pity cannot work for those
who are deemed responsible for the ills that have befallen them or those
who are considered dangerous to the community. Suffering must be seen

28. Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering, Morality, Media and Politics, trans. Graham
Burchell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 100.
29. Ibid., 155.
30. Loralea Michaelis, ‘Politics and the Art of Suffering in Hölderlin and
as undeserved, since pity cannot be experienced towards the culpable and the dangerous. William Connolly has rightly acknowledged in his ethical considerations on pity that ‘[s]ome of the most difficult cases arise when people suffer from injuries imposed by institutionalised identities, principles, and cultural understandings, when those who suffer are not entirely helpless but are defined as threatening, contagious, or dangerous to the self-assurance of these identities’.  

The elimination or alleviation of suffering is part of a process of governing, of social re-ordering, in which the causes of suffering are eradicated, dealt with or transformed. In governmental terms such an intervention has not only to represent and constitute a particular situation, but also to confer particular identities upon subjects. As Connolly has suggested, the subject of a politics of pity needs to be divorced from a construction of danger. The most important task for the politics of pity is therefore one of identifying trafficked women through dis-identifying them from such a dangerous subject. To activate the spectators’ pity, trafficked women must be specified as non-dangerous.

Michel Foucault’s analyses on the government of abnormals have shown how governmental interventions have become dependent upon the specification of the individual. Starting from the 18th century, punishment was no longer to be meted out according to the crime, but in close relation to the potential redemption and future danger of the individual. The invention of the ‘dangerous individual’, neither mad nor criminal, brought with it the need for expert knowledge to decide on her identity. A governmental technology, therefore, depends upon a particular description of the subject. Similarly, the politics of pity can only function for certain categories of individuals, i.e., the non-dangerous. Thus the question ‘who are you?’ is located at the heart of the regime governing trafficking through pity.

Strategising pity: trafficked women and physical suffering

A politics of pity has been advocated and practised by various NGOs involved in anti-trafficking campaigns with the explicit purpose of challenging governmental practices that considered trafficked women as illegal migrants and foreign prostitutes involved in illicit affairs. Jacqueline Berman has recently shown that the particular combination of the movement, ‘race’, and gender of migrant East European sex workers

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turns them into an external and internal threat by ‘disrupt[ing] the ability of the state to adjudicate membership in the political community’.

In this, she argues, trafficked women represent the threat of the other in the midst of the European social, political and moral order.

A politics of pity based on victimisation was supposed to challenge this type of threat construction—or what NGOs had called the ‘law enforcement’ approach to human trafficking, which considered trafficked women as illegal migrants and promptly deported them. It was argued that besides being victimised by their traffickers, women were also subjected to increased suffering by the state. As a result of these practices of second victimisation, victims of trafficking were thought either to fall easily prey to traffickers all over again, or to experience suffering and stigma when returned to their countries of origin. Pity was thought to disrupt the first securitisation of human trafficking, which turns women into dangerous illegal migrants, prostitutes and/or criminals; it was harnessed to a re-structuring of social relations in the sphere of trafficking and envisaged interventions specifically different from the repressive and preventive strategies embraced by those primarily concerned with migration and organised crime.

Just like the politics of pity generally, the specific strategies that NGOs have devised for redefining and relocating the trafficking of women in a different narrative have had their fair share of criticism. Jo Doezema has identified a worrying similarity between anti-trafficking campaigns and anti-slavery campaigns at the beginning of the 20th century she faults the former for thus proliferating images of ‘innocent’ victims and excluding any claims to rights by ‘guilty whores’. While condemning forced prostitution, such an approach offers nothing in the way of rights for the ‘guilty’, ‘voluntary’ prostitutes. Doezema’s objection points to the process of subjectivation I have already identified. Pity can be deployed as a governmental strategy only by answering the question of ‘who are you?’. The answer provided is initially delimited by considering whether the women are ‘worthy of pity’ and ‘non-dangerous’.

‘Worthy of pity’ needs to suspend the official distinction between innocent and guilty women present in official discourses. For Willy Bruggeman, deputy director of Europol, only a restricted category of victims are ‘sex slaves in the truest sense’. Other victims have not been entirely coerced or deceived. Although some would never have imagined the slave-like conditions under which they would have to work, they knew they were going to be employed in the sex industry. Others thought they were recruited to work in the service or entertainment industry, but were instead forced into prostitution. Often depicted as ‘happy hookers of Eastern Europe’, what connects all of these women is that they knowingly accepted to be illegal migrants. They are thus seen to be not entirely innocent and so not deserving of whole-hearted pity.

The politics of pity manages to avoid this distinction between guilty and innocent women that Doezeama warns against by appealing to an imaginary of common suffering. To promote understanding and sympathy for their situation, the advocates of pity focus on the directly physical pain and suffering trafficking causes. The main purpose of these accounts is to promote identification with victims of trafficking in a way that overcomes any internal divisions of trafficked women. Luc Boltanski has identified two strategies that can make all women equally innocent and deserving of pity.

One such strategy represents the suffering of trafficked women by directing it to a cause: the perpetrator of violence upon whom emotions and efforts will subsequently focus. This rather unproblematic topic of denunciation makes violence directly attributable to responsible agents. ‘It’s a baptism of brutality. In every case, trafficked women are raped and brutalised by their ‘owners’ and agents before they are put to work, to make them compliant and terrified’. Emotional accounts of trafficking focus on portraying the evil traffickers who exploit and reduce women to an undignified state of slavery.

The second strategy, focusing exclusively on women, is the topic of sentiment. Unlike the topic of denunciation, the topic of sentiment dispenses with accusation and the search for the victimiser or persecutor. It addresses the spectators who are to be moved by the

victims’ suffering and attempts to create a community of ‘visceral’ reactions, which pre-exist their principled justification.\(^{38}\) The physical suffering of trafficked women is meant to trigger such visceral reactions, to function as a ‘solidarity-inducing denominator’\(^ {39} \) and anti-trafficking campaigns have made extensive use of a symbolic of the body in pain: pierced, bleeding, and defenceless. These images, arbitrarily chosen from anti-trafficking campaigns, show how the suffering of victims is made directly physical; it is integrated within an imaginary of bodily suffering which cuts across any existing distinctions.

Besides effacing any distinctions between innocent and willingly or knowingly trafficked women, the strategy of universalisable physical suffering also has to function as a strategy of dis-identification. I have shown that the subject of a politics of pity has to be divorced from the dangerous subject. As trafficked women have been subjected to cruelty, their undeniable suffering at the hands of traffickers makes them extraordinary, beyond ordinary identifications with illegal migrants and prostitutes. Where their trajectory might have coincided with that of a migrant or prostitute, suffering is redeeming. Trafficked women are dis-identified from categories of migrants, criminals or prostitutes by the emphasis on raw physical suffering. Thus women who are trafficked into prostitution should not be deprived of their rights on grounds that they are undocumented migrants. The spectators’ prejudices or pre judgements on illegal migrants, prostitutes and criminals are suspended in the present of the politics of pity.

And yet, not all trafficking victims have been redeemed by physical suffering. Despite these unifying representations of inflicted pain, not all

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\(^{38}\) Ibid., 54.

victims have been physically abused, abducted and then repeatedly raped, beaten up, their bodies burned with cigarettes ends. It is almost as if women need to be ‘purified’ through blood, as in the OSCE poster. If some women are ‘innocent victims’, others would almost fit scenarios of receiving ‘just deserts’: their suffering incurred as a result of their reckless actions, i.e. undertaking a(n) (illegal) migration project. The ambiguities or inexistence of suffering—ambiguities which are increased when too much emphasis is placed on the lack of consent or prior knowledge—often require supplementary strategies of making ‘innocent’. Beauty and religiosity are mobilised as ‘innocenting’ strategies where raw, physical suffering is absent. Rescued by a reporter in London, Romanian Natasha is described in highly emotional terms:

A deeply religious girl, and stunningly pretty with dark blue eyes and beautiful olive skin, her hair braided into dozens of thin plaits like a foreign exchange student, Natasha knows that she shouldn’t have come to Britain and blames herself for what has happened. Yet she still harbours dreams of Montreal and Marius. ‘I just want to be an ordinary person,’ she says, crying gently. ‘A decent person with a man who loves me.’

The question of subjectivity does still not receive a final answer either in the representation of bodily pain and physical suffering or of beauty. The art of government requires knowledge of the individuals it is supposed to govern. Who are the women upon whom pity should be bestowed? The question ‘who are you?’ can never be completely answered by the incriminated individual. The confessional answers the women themselves provide, or the NGOs’ semi-confessional answers, need to be backed up by expert knowledge. Although the ‘psychiatrisation’ of criminal danger was based on procedures of confession, self-examination, and revelation, as Michel Foucault demonstrated at length, it also involved an expert assessment of the future risk that the individual could pose. Such a doubling of confession by the knowledge of risk was linked to the shift from thinking that punishment should answer the crime, to thinking of it as a mechanism in the ‘defence of society’. Thus, ‘Who are you?’/ ‘Who are the trafficked women?’ requires a supplementary answer. This answer, which addresses the

management and prevention of the phenomenon of trafficking, mobilizes technologies and knowledge of risk. The next section will look at how the ‘politics of risk’ as a governmental strategy to ‘defend society’ and manage social problems operates through collectivisation as well as individualisation of subjects.

Governmentality and the ‘politics of risk’

Although the language of risk is increasingly present in international politics, risk as a concept or category of understanding has been under-theorised in IR and—even more inexplicably—in security studies. Didier Bigo’s work, probably the only serious Foucault-inspired analysis of security practices as risk management, has only marginally crossed the Channel.43 On the Anglophone side, analyses of security have been mostly limited by a ‘fidelity’ to the Copenhagen School, whose theoretical framework excludes in principle a risk approach by rhetorically limiting securitisation to a structure of survival. As risks do not threaten survival, they cannot be accommodated by the securitisation framework.44

Despite Jef Huysmans’s criticism of this reductionist approach to security, conceptual analyses of risk have been eschewed.45 Recently Ole Waever has advocated ‘risk’ as appropriate for security studies, given the historical evolution of threats into risks.46 This ‘evolutionary’ approach is derived from the sociological literature on ‘risk society’, which, inspired mainly by Ulrich Beck’s writings, has placed risk at the core of post-industrial society. The main shift that Beck locates is a shift

45. Didier Bigo, Polices en réseaux, and ‘Identifier, categorizer et contrôler’, in La machine à punir: Pratiques et discours sécuritaires, eds. Gilles Sainati and Laurent Bonelli (Paris: L’esprit frappeur, 2000), 53–85. Since this paper was written, Huysmans’s article, ‘Conceptualizing Spill-over’, has felicitously undertaken such an analysis.
46. An analysis of discourses/practices of risk is also lacking in the poststructuralist and critical security studies literature.
from a society based on insurance to a society where technological challenges have brought home ‘the historically unprecedented possibility of the destruction through decision-making of all life on this planet’. 

Such an account reduces all practices of security to the common denominator of one type of risk, explainable within a certain understanding of modernisation/post-modernisation. It also limits risks to certain categories of technological risk and ignores the genealogy of risk and governmentality from the 18th century onwards. As Mitchell Dean has emphasised, what is significant about the government of risk is that it is a way of ordering reality that renders risk calculable. This calculability of risk makes it interesting for governing society and managing societal problems, such as, for example, human trafficking.

Unlike the sociology of risk, the literature which, in homage to Michel Foucault, calls itself ‘the governmentality literature’ sees risk as a ‘family of ways of thinking and acting, involving calculations about probable futures in the present followed by interventions into the present in order to control that potential future’. Following Foucault this literature has applied the conceptual and methodological insights offered by governmentality to various social locales, attempting to understand new strategies for governing society by means of risk management. In a governmental approach, risk is a component of diverse forms of calculative rationality for governing the conduct of individuals, collectivities and populations.

From its beginnings in practices by the welfare state to insure against work accidents, risk has become one of the main technologies of neo-liberalism, which attempts to create prudential, autonomous and self-regulating citizens. The complex regime of risk management today owes a debt to the various technologies of risk which have gradually developed over time in relation to the domains of insurance, work, and mental medicine. The meaning of risk itself is a cluster that can be

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disentangled only in its functioning: i) risk as a technical calculation which indicates the likelihood of an event/catastrophe happening; ii) risk in its everyday meaning, i.e., to describe a danger or a hazard; and iii) a clinical appreciation of risk.53

François Ewald has shown that for a long time the domain of risk has been co-extensive with the insurable.54 Risk as part of the insurable was an invention of the 19th century, which discovered the accident—something in-between nature and human will. Insurance risk therefore becomes social and is deployed as a ‘technology of solidarity’ which makes accidents, unemployment and other social problems collectively borne through insurance.55 This solidarity that insurance risk was supposed to foster in a collectivity, however, came to be opposed in another rationality of risk management; namely, prevention of social disorders. Formulated to deal with problems posed by ‘dangerous individuals’, delinquents, and criminals, this other rationality of risk has borrowed heavily from the expert knowledge provided by psychology and psychoanalysis. Such clinical rationality of risk was therefore initially focused on the likelihood of a person (in particular, a mentally ill person) committing a violent act. But if psychological savoir was taken out of the asylum and the clinic to govern the risk of dangerous behaviour of criminals, mental defectives, sexual perverts, and psychopaths, it has been extended to more and more ‘marginal’ categories, such as alcoholics, drug addicts, and children with learning disorders. As the authors of The Psychiatric Society have aptly put it, psychology colonised social life.56

Psychology and psychiatry have gradually taken up and transformed political, economic and social problems, and have made


these problems thinkable in new ways and governable by different
techniques.57 In her astute analysis of how the therapeutic paradigm functions in post-conflict societies, Vanessa Pupavac starts from the premise that ‘social psychology’s perspectives have become central to Western domestic social policy, to how Western governments relate to their own citizens and also how individuals in the West understand themselves’.58 However, psychology itself is colonised in a particular way by the already existing technologies of risk.

The risk management approach is a specific combination of the various rationalities and technologies of risk. In this preventive approach, risks do not arise from the presence of a particular danger, but are the effect of a ‘combination of abstract factors, which render more or less probable the occurrence of undesirable modes of behaviour’.59 Robert Castel has documented a mutation of social technologies that minimise direct therapeutic intervention, supplanted by an increasing emphasis on a preventive administrative management of populations at risk.60 Prevention means to anticipate the emergence of undesirable social behaviours within a population. More specifically, strategies of prevention are based on the assumption that if prevention is necessary, a danger exists, even if only in a virtual state before being actualised.

As these correlations remain arbitrary and can only be proven a posteriori, dangerousness becomes ‘a quality immanent to a subject’.61 The virtuality of danger is related to specific individuals and groups who are to be categorised as ‘high risk’. Risk practices therefore concern the qualitative assessment of people. Risk profiling is a privileged technique in the assessment of risk, based on ‘procedures for the allocation of individuals to risk groups, on a genealogical basis, in terms of a family history of illness or pathology, and/or on a factorial basis, in terms of combinations of factors statistically linked to a condition’.62

Although linked with the risk management of populations, preventive risk also involves a therapeutic objective in the administration of individuals diagnosed as pathological.\textsuperscript{63}

This double aspect of risk technologies, individualising and collectivising, appears most explicitly in clinical risk management. Clinical risk techniques, Weir has pointed out, ‘breach the distinction between disciplinary governance that acts on individual bodies and security governance that acts on populations’.

They implement population-based calculations, forming risk groups by applying risk categories to the bodies of persons who are then placed under surveillance or treatment. These risk techniques are based upon a combination of the characteristics of individual case studies and observation of patterns in a population and the identification of associated risk factors.\textsuperscript{65} Some groups are to be defined as ‘high risk’, with risk being defined as internal, due to their behaviour or biography, rather than external.

Clinical risk management mobilises psychological expertise to create risk profiles and contain the risk of various categories of people deemed to have mental and/or emotional problems. To statistical calculation, psychology has added a more important promise: ‘to provide inscription devices that would individualise such troublesome subjects’.\textsuperscript{66} Thus psychological expertise is needed to invent diagnostic categories, evaluations, assessments; it is needed to provide an individuated answer to the question at the heart of all acts of government: ‘who are you?’. A risk identity is therefore constituted through a combination of therapeutic interventions, pathological categorisations and a statistical calculation of the incidence of certain factors in a population group.

The preventive rationality of risk reveals an interesting dynamic between the groups ‘at risk’ and the calculation of ‘high risk’. Clinical risk first locates a series of abstract factors that are responsible for the emergence of certain behavioural patterns, diseases, and mental disorders. According to this logic, it is possible to say that children of alcoholic parents are also ‘at risk’ of being alcoholic, and that by being ‘at risk’, they also pose a potential risk to the community: a risk related with all the ‘disorders’ of alcoholism. Therefore those judged ‘at risk’ of being a danger to the community are subjected to therapeutic (e.g.,

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 146
\textsuperscript{65} Weir, ‘Recent Developments’, 374.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 382.
counselling, self-help groups, support groups) and disciplinary (training and re-training) practices in an effort either to eliminate them completely from communal spaces (e.g., by various forms of confinement) or to lower the dangers posed by their risk.  

Technologising risk: psychological trauma(s)

If the ‘politics of pity’ introduced the question of identity and attempted to offer a confessional or semi-confessional answer to the question, ‘who are the trafficked women?’ (i.e., ‘who are you?’), the politics of risk provides a scientific answer. Victims of trafficking cannot remain pure presence; their risk identity needs to be specified for the purposes of preventing human trafficking. Thus, the governance of human trafficking relies on technologies of delimiting and categorising ‘high risk’ groups, groups which are at risk of being trafficked.67 Trafficked women are profiled for preventive purposes and it is these specific profiles, developed in conjunction with psychological knowledge, that make possible the constitution of these women’s identity as a subject of governance. This representation of vulnerability is at first sight consonant with the unifying representations of victims as suffering bodies, as the risk is taken to be the risk to the women’s well-being. Yet, we shall see that trafficked women also mutate into a risk to the state/society, just as groups at risk were thought to embody a permanent possible danger.

The identification and calculability of risk depends on the construction of risk profiles. Studies of risk practices have emphasised the construction of biographical profiles of human populations for risk management and security provision.69 Victim profiles have also become ubiquitous in trafficking reports and studies of the phenomenon. The Council Framework Decision on combating trafficking in human beings identifies trafficked women as victims of coercion, force or threats, including abduction, deceit or fraud, abuse of authority and vulnerability.70 A report by the European Parliament (EP) explicitly defines and limits vulnerability as specifically due to ‘poverty, lack of

67. Lupton, 63.
69. Dean, Governmentality, 189.
education and professional opportunities’. It is interesting to see how the impact of ‘objective’ conditions and social situations is individualised in risk profiles.

In NGO analyses socio-economic conditions are being translated at the individual level as ‘a strong desire to seek employment abroad’, thus shifting the emphasis away from questions concerned with general conditions of inequality to questions concerned with individual psychological vulnerability. Other reports employ a similarly psychological redefinition in terms of the victim’s ‘wish for a better life’. A study by the IOM office in Romania found that 38 percent of girls between 15 and 18 years of age in orphanages were ready to ‘emigrate to a foreign job’, thus putting them at risk of being trafficked. The same study found that 38 percent of single women and girls aged 15 to 25, but only 20 percent of women and girls who lived with their parents, were ready to emigrate to a foreign job. Even when economic and social factors are concerned, a shift towards individualisation and psychologisation becomes apparent. The latest IOM study of vulnerability factors to trafficking in Romania even dismisses completely the hypothesis of ‘an objectively poor environment as a characteristic of vulnerability’.

Even if socio-economic risk factors such as poverty, lack of job opportunities, and gender inequalities are enumerated in the various reports on trafficking, their role is not only redefined under the influence of psychologisation, but also limited in practice. In interviews with the IOM and three other NGOs in Romania working for the reintegration of trafficked women in the country of origin, I found that because the economic aspect of the risk governance is very difficult to tackle, it is

75. These redefinitions are not limited to the NGO sector. A Europol overview of trafficking also redefines poverty and the hope or expectations of a more prosperous future as the vulnerabilities that are exploited by the traffickers. Europol, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings—A Europol Perspective’, January 2004.
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eclipsed by the more easily addressable concerns of psychological rehabilitation and recovery. The NGOs have liaised with EU actors by providing psychological expertise that could be more easily translated into practice compared to large scale economic and social interventions. Psychological counselling counts as one of the most important methods for victim assistance and reintegration. The Report by the Regional Clearing Point (RCP) on Trafficking in South Eastern Europe cites medical care and psychological counselling as the first two strategies of integration, while expressing concern about the little emphasis placed on educational assistance and lack of vocational and training programmes in transit and destination countries.

In the general assemblage of risk factors used to govern specific groups, trafficked women become mostly an assemblage of psychological risk factors. From the NGOs perspective, this shift to psychological profiling is not surprising, given that they understand trafficking as a traumatic experience for women. For psychological expertise, a traumatic experience is also linked with specific factors in the victim’s past. Animus, the main NGO involved with returned trafficked women in Bulgaria, warns that it is important to consider the predispositions that exist in the personal history of women and girls. Typical risk profiles of victims of trafficking will therefore include past biographical details deemed important by the experts:

77. IOM, ‘Who is the Next Victim? Vulnerability of Young Romanian Women to Trafficking in Human Beings’, [http://www.iom.int/DOCUMENTS/PUBLICATION/EN/Romania_ct.pdf] (28 October 2004). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the influence technologies of risk management have had for the EU’s economic approach to the ‘root causes’ of migration more generally, with respect to this I note that there an important literature that has analysed neo-liberalism or advanced economic liberalism and the shift to locating responsibility with the individual. For changes in the governance of unemployment and how economic factors have shifted to individual responsibility, see Mitchell Dean, ‘Governing the Unemployed Self in an Active Society’, *Economy and Society* 24, no. 4 (1995):559-583.
78. In January 2004 I conducted interviews with representatives of the IOM Bucharest, Ad Pare Bucharest, Reaching Out Piteşti and Save the Children Romania. Psychological counseling and therapy was foremost on their agenda; all victims of trafficking have to go through a therapy programme. While all of these NGOs were aware of the importance of the economic and social context, the task of helping women find jobs or get out from poverty proved daunting for most of them. Reaching Out is the only one that makes sure women have a job before they leave the shelter.
Most (Central and Eastern European) victims of women trafficking are between 18 and 25 years of age, unmarried and without children. Relatively often, victims of women trafficking, especially Central European victims, come from problem families—single parent families, alcohol abusing parents, incest, mistreatment, financial and housing problems, psychological problems.79

Significantly, victims are shown to have often experienced ‘exposure to violence at home or in a state institution’.80 Most victims have been abandoned by parents, friends, and/or husbands, and many have been sexually abused.81 They often come from dysfunctional families.82 The Bulgarian Animus also indicates that the groups most at risk of being trafficked are women and adolescents who have suffered traumatic experiences,83 e.g., victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, children from orphanages, and children with a large number of siblings and only one parent. 26 percent of the returned women at Animus had been victims of incest or childhood psychological abuse and all of them had untreated psychological trauma.84

Victims of trafficking thus suddenly begin appearing in reports as doubly traumatised, both by the experience of trafficking and by earlier/childhood experiences of abuse. This continuity of trauma is not

84. La Strada, ‘Who Are the Victims of Trafficking?’ [http://free.ngo.pl/lastrada/page2.html] (26 October 2004). ‘La Strada’ is one of the first NGOs
surprising for the psychological expertise. A classic of psychological trauma and an oft-mentioned reference by NGO documents, Judith Herman’s Trauma and Recovery states that adult survivors of child abuse are at great risk of victimisation in adult life.\(^85\) The experience of trafficking is thus an almost fated repetition of earlier traumas. Diana Tudorache, from the IOM shelter on Kosovo, clearly connects the two types of traumatic events: ‘The feelings of vulnerability and emotional pain that are experienced by the VoT [victims of trafficking], combined, often with a background of childhood abuse and mistreatment play a significant role in the occurrence and severity of the acute reactions’.\(^86\)

Within a short period (2001-2004), IOM Romania commissioned and published two studies of the vulnerability of the ‘young female population in Romania’.\(^87\) Based on interviews with women who have been trafficked, IOM has also produced victim profiles which emphasise their past traumas.

The past, however, especially a traumatic event in the victim’s past such as childhood abuse, a dysfunctional family environment, domestic violence and/or institutional abuse, activates another scenario of psychotherapeutic practices. As Julie Brownlie has pointed out in her remarkable article on the ‘young sexual offenders’, victimisation is not only an indicator of likely further abuse, but equally an indicator of future risky behaviour.\(^88\) Studies on victims of sexual abuse suggest that adult females who were sexually abused as children experience a variety of long-term sequelae including sexual disturbances, depression, anxiety, fear, and suicidal ideas and behaviour.\(^89\)

Victims of sexual abuse, psychological studies have shown us, are likely not only be re-victimised, but they might well become


\(^87\) Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery: From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror, 2nd edition (London: Pandora, 1997), 111.


\(^89\) IOM, ‘Vulnerability to Trafficking in Human Beings of Young Female Population of Romania: Main Findings of Sociological Research on Risk Factors and Geographical Distribution’, (Bucharest: The Center for Urban and Regional
‘perpetrators’ themselves. In cases of child abuse or violence, the necessity of abused children to defend themselves at an early stage in life might evolve into offending behaviour later on.\textsuperscript{90} On a less extreme level, women who have been sexually abused as children and those who have been traumatised are more likely to engage in future risk-taking behaviour than those who have not experienced abuse.\textsuperscript{91} Even those who claim that survivors of childhood abuse for example are more likely to be victimised than to victimise other people do not deny a connection with adult antisocial behaviour.\textsuperscript{92}

These are the insights that activate the rationality of risk management, which is concerned with limiting the possibility of a risky offender to re-offend. The spectre of potential offences, whether understood as antisocial, risky or even criminal behaviour surreptitiously infuses the politics of pity. If the continuity of trauma—which still construes sexual exploitation as the undeserved surplus of earlier, also undeserved, abuse and violence—could be thought of as consonant with the politics of pity, the inscription of risky-ness inscribed in the women’s biographical profiles ends up subverting pity. Strangely reminiscent of the governmentality of drug- and alcohol-addictions, ‘rehabilitation’ is the motto for victim assistance practices. The expert knowledge mobilised by NGOs with the purpose of helping trafficking women becomes ‘hijacked’ by a politics of risk, which is based on risk minimisation and containment. The women ‘at risk’ insidiously metamorphose into ‘high risk’ groups and risk technologies are deployed under the banner of therapy not just to help victims of trafficking overcome their trauma and ease their suffering, but also to limit the possibility of dangerous irruptions.

What is this dangerous irruption, what is the potential offending behaviour of trafficked women? EU documents are un-ambiguous on this point. If trafficked women are to re-offend, the offence is to be understood as immigration. The Council Proposal for a decision to combat human trafficking has explicitly stated that helping victims of

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trafficking or smuggling is a way of preventing them from lapsing into an illegal immigration situation.\textsuperscript{93} The joined EU-IOM-NGOs Brussels Declaration also harnesses victim reintegration to reducing the risk of re-trafficking.\textsuperscript{94} While trafficked women are involved in psychological therapy (often together with victims of domestic violence and rape), it is important to remember that these programmes are seen by the EU as part of prevention strategies and therefore need to be supplemented in most cases by return to the country of origin.\textsuperscript{95} A commission discussion paper on granting a short-term residence permit can even unproblematically conceive of the fight against illegal migration as two-pronged: through dismantling the networks as well as helping victims get out of their illegal situation and avoid lapsing into it again (which would also be linked with psycho-social measures).\textsuperscript{96}

From the standpoint of women, such prevention can only be read as a risk management of illegal migration which subverts and re-appropriates the non-judgemental concerns of a politics of pity. The risk of women migrating or being re-trafficked is thus to be contained and prevented; they are to be surveyed and disciplined, subject to trauma therapy with the purpose of turning them into subjects able to monitor their own risk. Risk technologies have made possible the specification of the victim—previously the object of pity—as inherently and perpetually ‘risky’, thus subverting the emotional promise of the politics of pity and turning it into an abstract suspicion of risk.

Conclusion: Questioning IR

This article has explored the articulation of a ‘politics of pity’ with a ‘politics of risk’ in the securitisation of human trafficking. Against an exclusively discursive methodological emphasis, it has endorsed a ‘governmental’ approach, which focuses on practical interventions and

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{93} Zimmerman, ‘Health Risks and Consequences’.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Herman, \textit{Trauma and Recovery}, 113.
\item \textsuperscript{95} EU Council, ‘Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings’.
\item \textsuperscript{97} The conditions for obtaining temporary residence permits imply either the cooperation of women in the prosecution of the trafficker or exceptional cases of threat or abuse. Most women are either ‘voluntarily returned’ or deported.
\item \textsuperscript{98} EC, ‘Short-Term Permit to Stay Granted to Victims of Trafficking or Smuggling Who Cooperate in the Fight against Smugglers and Traffickers’, Discussion Paper A/2/IGE D(2001), 23 October 2001.
\end{enumerate}
the constitution of subjects. I have attempted to understand how a humanitarian discourse constructed around women’s suffering can be reconciled with a logic of security, and have argued that the constitution of subjects to be governed through pity or risk makes it possible for the vulnerable body of trafficked women to become the site of potential dangerous irruptions.

As governmental interventions with the purpose of (re-)structuring the situation of trafficking, the politics of pity and the politics of risk each confer specific identities upon trafficked women: the politics of pity attempts to turn them into universally suffering bodies, while the politics of risk provides a scientific explanation of their vulnerability. Victims of trafficking are specified as groups ‘at risk’, bearing the particularity of both social conditions and of biography. For the rationality of risk management, the ‘discovery’ of the victims’ past traumas and abuse becomes an indicator of future risk. This particular construction of victimhood sees women as perpetuating a risk of illegal migration to Western society; to contain and neutralise this risk, they are to be surveyed and disciplined. Risk management becomes the insidious, disavowed presence within the humanitarian discourse that infuses and subverts the politics of pity.

This translatability of pity into risk raises an array of questions for our understanding of politics and political interventions. Despite the specificity of the articulation of strategies of pity with technologies of risk in the case of human trafficking, such an articulation is hardly exceptional in international politics. A politics of pity traverses concerns as varied as those for starving people in Ethiopia, genocide in Rwanda or the plight of refugees—and questions about the unacknowledged subverting presence of risk management need to be asked. If both pity and risk are governmental technologies, the symptomatic presence of risk subverting the logic of a politics of pity requires further interrogation. Is this conjunction of pity and risk a particular construction, or can one speak of a structural logic which cannot extricate pity from risk?

What does this conjunction of governmental practices of pity and risk entail for thinking political agency? If human rights have become the rights of those who are too weak or too oppressed to actualise and enact them, they are not ‘their’ rights. They are deprived of political agency; the only rights are our rights to practice pity and humanitarian interventions. Victims are therefore divorced from the very possibility of political agency, turned into spectral presences on the scene of politics. When agency exists even as a potentiality, they become risky beings. Trafficked women are risky only in relation to their agency as migrants. The political agency of the marginalised and the excluded, the powerless and the silenced is thus either effaced or pathologised, expunged from the truly political claims and implications it should have.
If the languages of emotions and risk have become the main political dialects of (late) modernity, these perverse connections between forms of governmentality ask for serious considerations of alternative concepts of politics. Where can one locate an alternative, radically anti-governmental politics in Michel Foucault’s sense? Recent attempts to recapture a form of ethics based on care, emotions, or pity fail to consider the constitutive role that psychological knowledge and risk technologies play for political subjects. Moreover, the analysis undertaken in this paper signals the inescapability of governmental representations. Post-structuralist IR has extensively and compellingly challenged fixed, taken-for-granted representations; yet new, multiple or floating representations can be nonetheless consonant with governmental practices. For power, it suffices to identify in order to govern; ‘what’ is identified is immaterial for governmental purposes. How can political subjects subtract from the governmental attachments to representable identity? How can they avoid the claustrophobic fixing of one identity and schizophrenic floating between multiple identities?

As the morphing of pitiable into risky subjects was made possible by the development of psychological and psychiatric knowledge from the late 18th century on, their epistemological effects in IR need to be further assessed. Given the governmental effects of psychological expertise, can one still use the language of psychology and psychoanalysis in politics? Therapeutic practices, the re-scripting of political events in the language of traumatic events or political behaviour in clinical language, render such an analysis politically dubious. However, this is not a blanket indictment of all ‘psy sciences’ as this paper itself has used a vocabulary indebted to several of the psychoanalytical concepts popularised by Slavoj Zizek. What counts for radical politics is to avoid the ‘normalising’ attempts of therapeutic practices to adapt the subject to the ‘normal’ functioning of the existing society and instead preserve the tension between the subject’s urges and social order.

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